HydroGraph: A $1Bn Graphene 'Science Project' Propped up by Paid Stock Promotion with No Path to Commercialization, Misrepresented Regulatory Approval, Unscalable Tech, and Failed Partnerships

Our research indicates that HydroGraph is a glorified science project with no commercial viability. The company has a track record of misleading investors, lacks regulatory approval, and spends far more on stock promotion than R&D. Like other hyped Canadian micro-caps, we believe the stock will collapse as the company fails to deliver and promoters cash out their windfall gains.

Initial Disclosure: After extensive research, we have taken a short position in shares of HydroGraph Clean Power Inc (CSE:HG, OTCQB:HGRAF). This report represents our opinion and is not financial advice. Do your own due diligence and don't take financial advice from strangers on the internet. Please read our full disclaimer at the bottom of this report.

• HydroGraph promotes itself as a leader of the so-called “graphene age”, boasting of producing the “most powerful graphene in the industry”, with 20–50nm particle sizes and >99% purity. In reality, it has produced less than 200kg ever, and generated sales of only $6k in 2024.
• HydroGraph’s fully diluted market capitalization exceeded ~$1.2 billion (CAD), and shares are up close to +1000% in one month on the back of an organized paid promotion campaign. Since 2023, HydroGraph has spent ~6x more on promotion, travel, and “professional fees” than on R&D.
  • Often without disclosure, paid promotion includes CEO.ca, Emerging Growth, Planet MicroCap, Jay Taylor Media, Darrow, and Metals Investor Forum.
  • Two PR firms, hired by HydroGraph, published case studies bragging how they manufactured hype around HG.
• HydroGraph is the latest in a long line of graphene promotions. Zentek, GMG, Versarien, Haydale, and Applied Graphene all sold the same dream of trillion-dollar graphene markets, fueled by endless promotional announcements. These promotes all failed to scale, diluted heavily, and had average stock price declines of 92% from peak. HydroGraph is running the same playbook.
• HydroGraph’s early backers include some of Canada’s most notorious microcap financiers including the DesLauriers twins, Hubert Barry Hemsworth, and PowerOne Capital (linked to convicted pump-and-dumper Morrie Tobin). These players all have track records of 90–100% shareholder wipeouts.
• HydroGraph has ~60M in-the-money warrants representing >$150M of paper gains. Typically, once a promote has run its course, insiders cash out and leave retail investors holding the bag.
• HydroGraph’s loudest promoter is Canadian financier Kevin Bambrough, who claims the idea originated from his son. His son previously worked at PowerOne Capital, a shop notorious for its long association with penny stock promotions.
  • PowerOne insiders helped HydroGraph raise millions, and they received large blocks of shares in return, likely at average prices <$0.20/share. If they’re still holding, at current prices they’d be sitting on >$10 million in profits.
• HydroGraph’s CEO Kjirstin Breure lacks any real operational experience in the graphene industry or in any industry.
  • Breure has held various titles at HydroGraph, including CEO, COO, President, and Director, but her actual involvement has always been in marketing and investor relations.
  • Breuer appears to have fabricated her CV, with experience listed in executive positions which were actually IR and marketing roles. For example, she claimed to work for Omada Technology Systems as a consultant, then later called it IR, and eventually branded herself as COO. Omada was a one-man software company that shut down without releasing any products. Omada also had ties to Harold Davidson, the co-founder of HydroGraph.
  • Breur’s LinkedIn profile claims she previously worked as a Portfolio Manager at a company called “Leona”, but we couldn’t find evidence of this company existing. Coincidentally, Leona is Breuer’s middle name, and an early filing stated that she was a “Digital Advertiser at Leona Studios” during the same time she claimed to be a portfolio manager.
• HydroGraph’s CFO and CAO left in 2024 and were replaced with a part-time CFO-for-hire with ties to other failing micro-caps.
• In 2025, HydroGraph’s independent Chair resigned, leaving CEO Kjirstin Breure to fill the role of both CEO and Chair.
• HydroGraph has repeatedly promoted partnerships which fail to produce sales and often go completely silent following the initial announcement.
  • VolfPack Energy has been hyped as a “large energy storage” partner which HydroGraph claimed would begin production in 2025. It is actually a pre-seed Sri Lankan startup that doesn’t expect to start pilot production until 2028–29. Volfpack, whose website states they’re willing to “partner with anyone”, is so early in its business cycle that they’re unable to pay for a lease for their production facility and have resorted to DIY methods to create a small room for their battery assembly. Pictures of facilities included below.
  • Hawkeye Bio is a partnership that HydroGraph has recycled as a new opportunity generated $2.5k of sales in 2021 and has not progressed since.
  • EMP Shield was supposed to develop electromagnetic shielding solutions using HG’s graphene.
  • Bazalt Holdings was a licensing deal from 2020 that yielded few thousand in one-off sales and has quietly fizzled.
• HydroGraph has a long history of broken promises.
  • The company first guided to commercialization for 2022. They then pushed the goalposts to 2023, then to 2024, and still have yet to deliver.
  • In May 2024, management claimed “multiple large contracts” were imminent. 2024 revenue was $6,172.
  • In mid-2024, they claimed EPA approval was “six months away”. It’s been 12 months and still no EPA approval.
  • After eight years, HydroGraph still has no approvals, no customers, no scale, and no credible path forward.
• HydroGraph touts its “verification” by The Graphene Council to confer legitimacy. The Graphene Council is a for-profit trade group, owned and operated by a career consultant with no scientific credentials or scientific background.
  • The “verification” program itself is a paid membership that has certified only a few companies, several of which are now bankrupt or defunct. The Graphen Council “verified” peers like Versarien, which collapsed and became a pennystock.
  • An industry insider told us that getting a verification costs $50k-$60k and there is no threshold for passing or failing. He says: “They just put the results into a report and send it back. There’s no classification.”
• HydroGraph licenses a detonation process from Kansas State University, and claims its reactor design can produce 10MT annually. In reality, the entire company has produced less than 0.2MT total over five years.
  • Despite its production shortcomings, HydroGraph’s fully diluted market cap is double that of proven peer NanoXplore (~$500M), which has a capacity of 4,000 MT annually and generates $100M+ in revenue. Investors are paying unicorn prices for what a former HG employee describe as a “science project”.
• Industry experts and former insiders told us the probability of success was “zero”. Insiders confirmed that the machines require constant downtime and maintenance, making scaling impossible.
• To achieve commercial scale, HydroGraph requires EPA approval and without it, they are restricted to selling small R&D batches. Former employees told us approval is at least 5–10 years away.
  • We believe HydroGraph could get approval within the next 2 years, but with onerous restrictions on use cases and customers. Either way, the timeline for EPA approval is uncertain and profitability is a pipe dream.
• FDA approval for food and beverage packaging “may never” occur due to nanoparticle toxicity: HydroGraph’s 20–50nm particles are ~1,900x smaller than approved peers, raising inhalation and organ accumulation risks. Without regulatory clearance, HydroGraph’s supposed trillion-dollar TAM is a fantasy.
  • HydroGraph claims to be the “most cost-effective producer” in the industry, but insiders reveal that this plan ignores critical costs like acetylene production, compression, transport, and safety infrastructure. Competitor NanoXplore sells exfoliate graphene for $10/kg, while HydroGraph claims its graphene will cost $200-250/kg. At the same time, HydroGraph insiders estimate the actual cost of production at $500–800/kg!
• Hydrograph’s product has no real market. The battery market is already locked up by cheaper proven solutions like carbon black and carbon nanotubes. At the same time, potentially big markets like concrete, coatings, and composites are incredibly price sensitive and rely on penny-per-kg additives, making Hydrograph’s $200/kg graphene a non-starter.
• The economics are equally broken. We estimate Hydrograph’s absolute cost floor to be ~$50/kg with $200–250/kg selling prices, versus entrenched competitors at $1–3/kg for carbon black, $20–50/kg for carbon nanotubes, and <$10/kg for carbon fiber. With graphene costing an order-of-magnitude more, it’s uneconomic. Even if it has performance advantages in some applications, the high cost means it will never have meaningful market share.
• HydroGraph appears to be misrepresenting its product to investors. Hydrograph claims to produce “100% crystalline” and “100% SP2 bonded” graphene. We spoke to an industry expert with a PhD in nanomaterials, who said that this is a scientific impossibility since true SP2 requires single-layer graphene while their own filings admit an average of six layers. The most precise method to produce single-layer graphene is chemical vapor deposition (CVD), and even CVD doesn’t produce 100% SP2 bonded graphene because of the presence of defects. Further, HydroGraph’s own filings admit that their graphene is not single-layer, but rather an average of six layers.
• Hydrograph claims its manufacturing process can be scaled by replicating their small explosive chambers, but each run requires venting flammable gas, scraping soot, and resealing which is a manual, unsafe, and costly process. Also, the explosive production process causes extensive wear and tear, leading to downtime, and shortening the reactor lifespan to well below the 20-year life implied by HydroGraph. This means the true CapEx and OpEx are far higher than the company claims.
• HydroGraph claims to be the only producer of “high-purity graphene”. However, UK-based Levidian Nanosystems claims to produce >99% pure graphene, has real customers (ADNOC, United Utilities), reputable investors (Baker Hughes, Abu Dhabi sovereign fund), and claims to have revenue of £10M in 2024.
• HydroGraph is audited by MNP LLP, a Canadian accounting firm notorious for rubber-stamping low-quality issuers and China-linked frauds, according to PCAOB records.

HydroGraph’s story is not new, it follows a well-worn Canadian microcap playbook:

1. Dress up a university science project as a promising new company.
2. Hype the technology as a revolutionary breakthrough with an enormous TAM.
3. Promote, promote, promote – Flood retail channels with promotion, announce fake partnerships, and raise money through toxic dilution.
4. Promoters cash out their windfall gains while the stock nosedives.

Origins: Born From a University Science Project, Packaged by a Serial Stock Promoter

HydroGraph traces its origins back to 2017, when Canadian financiers Harold Davidson and Hubert Barry Hemsworth licensed a detonation-based graphene production process from researchers at Kansas State University. At its core, the “technology” involves igniting acetylene and oxygen in a controlled chamber to produce graphene flakes.

source: HydroGraph Investor Presentation, Nov. 2024, pg 4

The company was initially incorporated as Carbon-2D Graphene Inc, and in 2021 rebranded as HydroGraph Clean Power Inc. Before we delve into the company’s technology and why it’s neither scalable nor marketable, we need to look at the people behind the company.

First up is Hubert Hemsworth. Hemsworth is neither a scientist nor an operator, instead he’s a notorious Canadian stock promoter with a penchant joining companies that destroy shareholder value. Over the last three decades, he has advised or sat on the boards of numerous speculative small-cap companies spanning mining, energy, biotech, and cleantech. Most of the companies he’s been involved in have collapsed, many have been delisted, and nearly all have left investors wiped out.

Shareholder returns for companies associated with Hubert Hemsworth

HydroGraph is the New Shiny Object for a Familiar Cast of Canadian Microcap Stock Promoters and Financiers

HydroGraph spends little on R&D and has no revenue. This illustrates that HydroGraph is not really in the business of breakthrough scientific research or selling graphene. It is focused on promoting its stock and selling shares. Behind all the press releases and interviews is a familiar cast of Canadian microcap financiers whose ventures have followed the same pattern: promote, extract, collapse.

PowerOne Capital: Notorious Canadian Microcap Financier

Among the names involved in HydroGraph, none is more emblematic of the Canadian microcap playbook than PowerOne Capital. The firm has been involved in HydroGraph since its earliest raises, where PowerOne insiders and related parties accumulated large blocks of stock and warrants, often at prices below $0.20 per share. They accumulated millions of shares held through various shell companies and related parties. Then the promotion campaign began, culminating in the recent parabolic move in share price.

Shareholder List from June 2021, see Schedule B

PowerOne is notorious for its association with aggressively promoted companies. The firm has acted as a deal sponsor, promoter, and private placement shop for some of the most disgraced microcap issuers of the last two decades. These stocks almost universally ended in massive shareholder losses.

Here’s a sample from the long list of PowerOne failures:

Shareholder returns for companies associated with PowerOne

PowerOne has been singled out by Canadian regulators in past investigations as a hub for questionable financings.

Kevin Bambrough has recently emerged as HydroGraph’s most vocal promoter. Bambrough gives credit to his son for discovering the company and bringing it to his attention. Bambrough employs his son, but interestingly, his son’s previous employer was none other than PowerOne. His Twitter only has posts about HydroGraph, including those from the summers he spent working with PowerOne.

It’s an incredible coincidence that same shop that seeded the stock with cheap paper also supplied the voices that helped amplify the story once the promotion cycle began in earnest during mid-2025

source: LinkedIn Profile

Enter the Deslauriers Twins

Beyond PowerOne Capital is an even longer list of suspect early backers of HydroGraph. Among them is David DesLauriers, a figure whose name is practically shorthand for shareholder wipeouts in the Canadian microcap scene. Across decades of involvement in promotional ventures, DesLauriers’ record is astonishing in its consistency: our analysis shows a median return of –100% and an average loss of nearly –98% in the companies he has financed.

shareholder returns for companies associated with David DesLauriers

HydroGraph’s cap table reads like a who’s who of Canada’s most discredited financiers. Among them is Gordon Scott Paterson, who was fined $1.1 million and banned for six months by the Ontario Securities Commission for pumping, insider trading, and ignoring compliance rules. The other financiers and their horrendous track record includes:

shareholder returns for companies associated with HydroGraph insiders

HydroGraph looks less like a graphene revolution and more like the latest installment of the promote playbook: acquire academic IP, slap on a retail-friendly brand, and promote aggressively until insiders cash out.

HydroGraph’s Promotion Machine: A Case Study in Paid Hype, Endless Conferences, and Lack of Progress

Over the past year, HG shares have rocketed more than 1,500% from just CAD $0.12 to over CAD $2.95. HydroGraph has flooded retail channels with a barrage of interviews, conference appearances, and “thought leader” features, almost all of which were paid placements. The stock has surged not because of real scientific breakthroughs or commercial progress but because of relentless stock promotion. In the last three years, the company has spent substantially more on travel and promotion expenses than R&D, by a margin of almost 6x.

In 2025 alone, HydroGraph presented at:

• The Emerging Growth Conference (Feb, Apr, May)
• Metals Investor Forum (March)
• Planet MicroCap in Las Vegas (May)
• multiple Jay Taylor Media appearances (March, July, August)
• OTC Markets’ Virtual Investor Conference (April)
• Hemispheric Security Conference (May)
• and a steady stream of CEO.CA and PACTA IR webinars

In the past month, HydroGraph promoters have released at five videos, including Jay Taylor Media episodes and “Energetic Inc’s” (Kevin Bambrough’s Podcast). The videos are targeted at retail investors, tout false information, and have titles like “HydroGraph. A Thousand Dollar Stock?”.

source: YouTube; Jay Taylor Media; HydroGraph. A Thousand Dollar Stock?; Aug 7, 2025

Each of these venues comes with disclaimers: they are paid promotions. Emerging Growth Conference, Planet MicroCap, and CEO.CA all disclose that HydroGraph is a paying client. Even Jay Taylor Media, which publishes bullish research notes and fawning interviews with HydroGraph’s CEO, has acknowledged receiving payment. The “research” is indistinguishable from advertising, yet is dressed up as credible coverage for retail consumption.

Below is a sample of the entities paid to promote HydroGraph.

HydroGraph paid the parent company of The Deep Dive:

source: thedeepdive.ca; archived May 19, 2025

HydroGraph paid Dynamic Wealth Research:

source: dynamicwealthresearch.com; archived March 4, 2025

HydroGraph paid International Deal Gateway (IDG):

source: dealgateway.com; archived Feb 9, 2025

HydroGraph paid PrivatePlacements.com:

source: privateplacements.com; archived June 20, 2023

Metals Investor Forum:

source: metalsinvestorforum.com; archived May 7, 2025

Emerging Growth Conference:

source: emerginggrowth.com; archived March 17, 2025

The promotion cycle was so effective that HydroGraph’s paid contractors bragged about it. Both Fox Agency and Blender Media published “success stories”, boasting of glossy reports and splashy email blasts designed to amplify the company’s promotional reach.

Blender published an “Investor Marketing Case Study” on its work promoting HydroGraph to investors:

source: blendermedia.com; archived Dec 5, 2024

Blender promoted HydroGraph through email marketing, display ads, and long-form reports. They even splashed a giant $2.5 billion figure across their materials, as if the sheer size of the number, divorced from any substance, was reason enough to buy the stock. It read less like investor information and more like a billboard for a pump.

source: blendermedia.com; archived Aug 23, 2025

Fox Agency touted their success promoting HydroGraph and its executives through paid placements and interviews:

source: fox.agency; archived Aug 11, 2025

Instead of improving their product or focusing on sales, HydroGraph spend their time on stock promotion and empty PRs that masqueraded as progress.

Meanwhile, the dollars are flowing out of HydroGraph’s treasury not into prototypes or test batches, but rather this promotional machine. In the last three years, HydroGraph spent more (on an aggregate basis) than 6x on professional fees and IR compared to its minuscule R&D budget.

HydroGraph calls itself “the world’s premier graphene producer” yet barely generated $6,000 in revenue in 2024. The company lacks regulatory approvals, lacks supply contracts and hasn’t proven that its technology is scalable. What it does have is a sprawling promotional network blasting the same story across every retail platform willing to take a fee.

HydroGraph isn’t in the graphene business - It’s in the stock promotion business.

Graphene Graveyard: HydroGraph Is Just The Latest Promote

The HydroGraph pitch may sound bold, but it’s a rerun of a tired script. Over the past decade, investors have been promised a “graphene revolution” more times than they can count. Companies like Zentek, GMG, Versarien, Haydale, and Applied Graphene all claimed trillion-dollar markets were within reach, fueled their stories with flashy partnership announcements, and assured investors that scale was just around the corner. None delivered. Instead, they burned cash, diluted shareholders, and collapsed from their peaks, leaving retail investors holding the bag. See below for how they performed:

Shareholder returns in graphene companies

Leadership at HydroGraph: CEO Lacks Experience, Revolving Door of CFOs and Board Members

HydroGraph’s leadership team isn’t built to make or sell graphene, it’s built to promote stock.

At the center is CEO Kjirstin Breure, a thirty-something former executive assistant and investor relations rep with no operational experience and a resume filled with half-truths and outright lies.

CEO Kjirstin Breure: When the IR Rep Becomes the CEO, You Know it’s a Promotion Machine

Breure’s rise to the top had nothing to do with building businesses or scaling production. She began at HydroGraph as the investor relations lead, before being elevated to CEO.

source: HydroGraph Press Release; Nov 10, 2022

Breure’s professional background raises serious credibility questions. Her work history has repeatedly changed in company disclosures, obscuring her prior roles in marketing and IR while inflating her business experience through fabricated companies and job titles.

Fabricated Job at Omada Technology

In 2021, Breure claimed she was a “Consultant for Omada”:

source: HydroGraph prospectus; Oct 18, 2021; page 30

By early 2023, Breure claimed she did “Investor Relations with Omada”:

source HydroGraph Investor Presentation: February 2023

By mid-2023, Breure claimed to have been the “Chief Operating Officer with Omada”:

source HydroGraph Investor Presentation: June 2023

Maybe next she’ll claim to be the CEO and founder of Omada. Never mind that Omada was really a one-man company out of Vancouver with zero employees, and which shut down without releasing a product.

source ecsagency.com/our-work/

source OpenCorporates.com

Fake Job at Nonexistent Company “Leona”

Breure’s resume claims a past role as a Portfolio Manager at an Amsterdam firm called “Leona”. We could find no evidence that such a firm ever existed. In reality, Breure’s background was in digital advertising and “Leona” just happens to be her middle name.

Kjirstin Beure claims Portfolio Manager on her LinkedIn profile:

source: LinkedIn Profile - Kjirstin Breure

While Hydrograph’s Prospectus states that she was a Digital Advertiser at Leona Studios:

source: HydroGraph prospectus; Oct 18, 2021; page 30

A Revolving Door of CFOs, Rent-A-CFO from Malaspina

HydroGraph’s CFO and Chief Accounting Officer both quit in 2024. Rather than attract credible replacements, the company turned to Malaspina Consultants a “CFO-for-hire” shop that cycles part-time financial officers into dozens of shaky Canadian microcaps. HydroGraph’s current CFO splits time across multiple companies.

source Google search for “Malaspina Consultants”

The CEO Who Walked Away, Stuart Jara’s Quiet Exit

HydroGraph’s former CEO, Stuart Jara, once pitched imminent commercialization and regulatory approvals. By early 2024, he quietly resigned to run a wiring harness company, a business with no connection to graphene or advanced materials. He doesn’t even list HydroGraph on his LinkedIn profile.

source: LinkedIn Profile - Stuart Jara

Independent Chair Resigns, Leaving Gap in Oversight

In 2025, HydroGraph’s independent Chairperson resigned, allowing Breure to become CEO and Chairperson. This removed the last semblance of independent oversight. Even HydroGraph’s auditor, MNP LLP, has a history tied to dubious Canadian listings and Chinese reverse-merger frauds. Governance at HydroGraph mirrors the rest of the story: no accountability, no oversight, and no credible leadership.

Illusion of Progress: Partnerships That Fail To Deliver

HydroGraph doesn’t have customers, it has empty press releases. For years the company has rolled out a parade of “strategic partnerships” and MOUs that read well in a press release but never convert to contracts, scale, or revenue. When you pull on the threads, the illusion collapses. Here is a summary of all the supposed “contracts”/ “partnerships”.

VolfPack: A Sri Lankan Pre-Seed Startup Willing to ‘Partner With Anyone, HydroGraph Pretends It’s Ready to Scale, When its Decades Away From Piloting

In early 2024, HydroGraph teased a soon-to-be “large energy storage” deal, guiding at tonnage volumes tied to pilot results “in 2025.”

source: HydroGraph PR; April 30, 2024

source: HydroGraph Investor Presentation - July 2024, page 21

source: HydroGraph PR

VolfPack’s website shows that it’s a pre-seed Sri Lankan startup with pilot production not planned until 2028–29.

source: volfpackenergy.com

source: volfpackenergy.com

The company is clearly early-stage and doesn’t match up to the promotional press releases HydroGraph wrote. As an example, the company couldn’t afford to have professionals create an assembly room, so the employees did the carpentry and plumbing themselves.

source: Blog post by VolfPack CEO, Charlie Karunaratne; Dec 31, 2024

VolfPack’s website even says they’re willing to “partner with anyone”. Even though VolfPack was a pre-seed startup with an uncertain future, HydroGraph hyped it as a near-term opportunity with massive potential.

HydroGraph’s Partnership With Hawkeye Looks Like a Dead Venture

HydroGraph has leaned heavily on its supposed “partnership” with Hawkeye Bio, but the reality is more smoke than substance. The partnership was first disclosed in 2021 and generated just $2,500 in sales, before fading into dormancy.

source: HydroGraph 2021 MD&A Page 2

Since then, HydroGraph has repeatedly recycled the same announcement to make it appear like a new and exciting opportunity, despite no evidence of progress, or subsequent sales.

Ceylon Graphene: Grand Promises, Fish-Market Reality

In March 2023 HydroGraph signed a letter of intent with Ceylon Graphene, another Sri-Lankan company trumpeting claims like “+47% charging improvement” for lead-acid batteries and flagging a $45B market opportunity.

source: HydroGraph Press Release; March 14, 2023

Then… silence. Ceylon, once “verified” by The Graphene Council, disappeared from the registry.

source: Internet Archive, The Graphene Council

Ceylon’s listed office at “100/1 Sri Jayawardenapura Mawatha, Sri Lanka” is a building behind a fish market.

source: Google Maps

Ceylon’s “most recent partner” is Argo Graphene, a company that until April 2025, was a soil/biofertilizer business.

source: Argo Graphene Press Release; July 31, 2025

source: Argo Graphene Website; archived April 1, 2025

HydroGraph quietly stopped mentioning Ceylon once the optics turned farcical.

EMP Shield Scales, HydroGraph Nowhere to Be Found

In September 2023, HydroGraph announced a collaboration with EMP Shield to develop products using HydroGraph’s graphene. EMP Shield makes hardware that protects electronic devices from electromagnetic interference (EMI).

source: HydroGraph Press Release; Sep 11, 2023

It’s been two years since the announcement, and there have been no updates or sales from this collaboration. At this date, EMP Shield’s website includes to mention of products with graphene and the company’s 2025 product catalog includes no graphene-enhanced products.

Middle East Theater: Photo-Ops But No Factories

In April 2024, HydroGraph announced an MOU with a “leading research institution” in the Middle East for “technology transfer.”

Since the photo-op: no follow-ups, no R&D program, no deployments.

In May 2024, HydroGraph announced another MOU with Gulf Cryo to bring Hyperion reactors to the Middle East.

source: HydroGraph Press Release; May 21, 2024

Gulf Cryo is a large industrial gas company that also produces acetylene, the feedstock for HydroGraph’s Hyperion reactors. Given HydroGraph’s claims, the two companies are ideal partners to establish graphene production in the Middle East. So, it raises alarm bells that HydroGraph has gone silent on the partnership, providing no updates since it was announced over a year ago. What happened to the MOU? Did Gulf Cryo do its due diligence and decide HydroGraph’s technology was not viable?

Bazalt Holdings - A Dead Partnership

Prior to going public, HydroGraph had an agreement to license their technology to Bazalt Holdings in exchange for potentially millions in royalties and investment in HydroGraph. HydroGraph’s financials show that this agreement resulted in a few thousand dollars in sales for four kgs of graphene.

source: HydroGraph MDA; Dec 31, 2021

A Former Employee of Hydrograph told us that the blizzard of MOUs have no substance, INCLUDING the potential ‘military contracts’

Former insiders describe HydroGraph’s “pipeline” bluntly: “hopes”, not customers. The much-teased military angle is a similar mirage; internal conversations were exploratory at best, not active procurements, and the volumes discussed were so niche that they “wouldn’t even justify turning on the machines.” Yet management has repeatedly pointed to “military interest” in retail interviews as if it were imminent business. He said:

“When I looked at it [military use cases] from a logical perspective, and graphene, it takes such a small amount. If you’re going to do a very niche, small application, the quantities weren’t enough to even justify turning on the machine. You wouldn’t sell enough. That’s one of the reasons I never focused on that, because the quantities wouldn’t be there.”

– Former HydroGraph employee

This is completely different to what Breure said in a recent YouTube interview (0:55):

HydroGraph’s “partnerships” are nothing more than press releases, not actual commercial partnerships. Even worse, HydroGraph’s partners aren’t serious ventures in our opinion VolfPack can’t pilot for years. Ceylon fell off the map. EMP Shield moved on without them. Hawkeye’s leaders carry a history of blown stories and wrecked cap tables; the use-case volumes are trivial. The Middle East MOUs provided optics, not factories. And Bazalt, like so many before it was noise, not business.

A Timeline of Broken Deadlines and Empty Claims

HydroGraph has followed the classic penny-stock playbook: make grandiose promises about commercial milestones, miss every single one, quietly shift timelines, and distract investors with recycled press releases. The gap between what management says and what they actually deliver could not be wider. Below is a summary of all their empty promises and failures:

EPA Approval Has Yet to Materialize

HydroGraph cannot legally sell graphene in commercial quantities without approval from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Management first claimed in January 2023 that approval was “well on its way” and promised it would arrive by the end of 2024.

source: HydroGraph Press Release; Jan. 17, 2024

An EPA audit occurred in September 2023. After two years, nothing has happened and the company has admitted approval won’t come until at least 2025.

source: HydroGraph 2025 MD&A, Page 3

The 2025 shareholder letter doesn’t mention the EPA at all, a glaring omission given the company’s repeated failures to meet its timelines.

Two Years of “Commercial Readiness”: Less than One Ton of Graphene Sold

In May 2023, management announced that its Hyperion process was “ready for commercialization” and capable of producing 10 metric-tonnes per year.

source: HydroGraph 2025 MD&A, Page 3

Two years later, HydroGraph hasn’t produced or sold a single commercial tonne. In 2024, revenue was just $6,172, less than what one tonne of graphene would fetch at HydroGraph’s own stated prices. The company books no inventory on its balance sheet, raising the obvious question: if they can make commercial graphene, where is it?

Instead, HydroGraph appears to be giving away free samples to dress up “strategic partnerships” that never mature into paying customers.

source: HydroGraph 2024 Financial Statements

The PET Plastic Mirage

One of the most hyped targets was the PET plastics industry. In 2024, management claimed discussions with three major producers, pilot scale-up in Q3, and FDA approval within 12 months.

source: HydroGraph Investor Presentation - July 2024, page 21

In an investor webinar, they said they expected to sell “hundreds of tonnes” of graphene into soda bottles and food packaging.

The result? Not hundreds of tonnes. Not tens of tonnes. Not a single tonne. Instead, HydroGraph booked $6k of revenue, showing that the PET claims was smoke and mirrors.

A Pattern of Missed Deadlines

HydroGraph’s production timeline is a graveyard of broken promises:

2022: Commercial scale production targeted.

source: Internet Archive, https://hydrograph.com/about/; Dec 6, 2022

2023: Pushed to 2023.

source: Internet Archive, https://hydrograph.com/about/; July 5, 2025

2024: Moved again to 2024.

2025: Still not producing commercial graphene.

Meanwhile, CEO Breure was telling investors in May 2024 to expect “multiple very large sales within 2024.” Actual results: $6k in revenue

After years of missed milestones, failed partnerships, and fictionalized timelines, HydroGraph has yet to prove it can sell commercial graphene, or even legally make it. The company keeps moving the goalposts, but the outcome is always the same: no revenue, no contracts, no production. Just promotion.

Unscalable Technology

Setting aside the fact that HydroGraph’s graphene is too costly, the company’s technology doesn’t scale. HydroGraph’s reactors are, in essence, controlled bombs. Each 16-liter chamber must be purged, scraped, and resealed after every detonation. As one industry expert summarized:

“Always a costly product. In short, this process at scale is essentially a bomb.”

– Graphene Industry Expert

Another summarized:

“Probability of success is 0.”

– Graphene Industry Insider

The combination of chaotic reproducibility, toxic regulatory barriers, high input costs, and zero credible customers leaves HydroGraph in one place: a perpetual R&D curiosity, never a commercial business.

“There is no material on earth that can sustain more than 1,000 explosions and still stand there. Maybe the CapEx is interesting to begin with, but the lifetime is nowhere near 20 years…more like three. Insurance costs, employee reluctance, constant cleanup…it’s fundamentally unscalable”

– Graphene Industry Expert

HydroGraph Is a Science Project, Not a Business

Stripped of all the marketing and hype, HydroGraph’s prospects are bleak:

• No commercialization despite years of promises
• Multiple failed partnerships
• False claims of purity and batch consistency
• Regulatory hurdles that make sales impossible for a decade
• Costs 10x higher than competitors
• Expert consensus that the technology is not scalable or cost-effective
• Leadership with no real-world production experience

“Frankly, I’m impartial to the technology. I know the product it creates, but also know that the technology is not scalable into anything significant.”

– Former HydroGraph Employee

HydroGraph is not a graphene company, it’s a university science project wrapped in a promotional campaign to make it look like the next big thing.

Summary

HydroGraph follows in a long tradition of Canadian micro stocks who make big claims and use promotional campaigns to lure in gullible retail investors. Like other Canadian micro cap pumps, when you look past the hype, the reality is quite bleak.

HydroGraph is a university science project that spends far more on stock promotion than on research and development. Despite a constant stream of press releases and interviews touting their technology and partnerships, the company has no material sales or customers. It has repeatedly missed timelines and failed to deliver on its promises. HydroGraph has only ever produced small R&D batches of graphene because it lacks EPA approval for commercial production.

Our research indicates that HydroGraph’s production process is not commercially viable. HG claims that each of their Hyperion machines can produce 10 tonnes of graphene annually. In reality, the company has never produced 1% of that amount. Former insiders and industry experts confirm that HydroGraph’s production process is expensive, not scalable, and not commercially viable.

HydroGraph also lacks leadership with real-world experience in commercial production. We couldn’t find a single employee with experience producing anything, let alone graphene. This could in part explain management’s naive assumptions about scalability and the cost of commercial production.

After years of failing to deliver, HydroGraph will likely continue to make hollow promises about upcoming sales and partnerships that never materialize. With no revenue or real partners, HydroGraph will likely continue to raise capital through highly dilutive stock and warrant sales.

With a promotional campaign in full swing, HydroGraph’s stock surged 1000% in one month, and millions of warrants and options are now deep in-the-money. The stock price will likely crash as the company fails to deliver on its promises and promoters cash in their windfall profits.

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