Introduction

We uncovered extensive evidence that Richtech Robotics is not what it claims to be, and insiders have engaged in fraudulent schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders. We spoke with many people connected to the company, including former employees, suppliers, distributors, partners, and customers. We also reviewed records from all over the world, including company filings, lawsuits, patents, trademarks, property records, import/export data, and much more.

Introduction

We uncovered extensive evidence that Richtech Robotics is not what it claims to be, and insiders have engaged in fraudulent schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders. We spoke with many people connected to the company, including former employees, suppliers, distributors, partners, and customers. We also reviewed records from all over the world, including company filings, lawsuits, patents, trademarks, property records, import/export data, and much more.

Introduction

We uncovered extensive evidence that Richtech Robotics is not what it claims to be, and insiders have engaged in fraudulent schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders. We spoke with many people connected to the company, including former employees, suppliers, distributors, partners, and customers. We also reviewed records from all over the world, including company filings, lawsuits, patents, trademarks, property records, import/export data, and much more.

Introduction

Our research indicates that HydroGraph is a glorified science project with no commercial viability. The company has a track record of misleading investors, lacks regulatory approval, and spends far more on stock promotion than R&D. Like other hyped Canadian micro-caps, we believe the stock will collapse as the company fails to deliver and promoters cash out their windfall gains.

Key Findings

• HydroGraph promotes itself as a leader of the so-called “graphene age”, boasting of producing the “most powerful graphene in the industry”, with 20–50nm particle sizes and >99% purity. In reality, it has produced less than 200kg ever, and generated sales of only $6k in 2024.
• HydroGraph’s fully diluted market capitalization exceeded ~$1.2 billion (CAD), and shares are up close to +1000% in one month on the back of an organized paid promotion campaign. Since 2023, HydroGraph has spent ~6x more on promotion, travel, and “professional fees” than on R&D.
  • Often without disclosure, paid promotion includes CEO.ca, Emerging Growth, Planet MicroCap, Jay Taylor Media, Darrow, and Metals Investor Forum.
  • Two PR firms, hired by HydroGraph, published case studies bragging how they manufactured hype around HG.
• HydroGraph is the latest in a long line of graphene promotions. Zentek, GMG, Versarien, Haydale, and Applied Graphene all sold the same dream of trillion-dollar graphene markets, fueled by endless promotional announcements. These promotes all failed to scale, diluted heavily, and had average stock price declines of 92% from peak. HydroGraph is running the same playbook.
• HydroGraph’s early backers include some of Canada’s most notorious microcap financiers including the DesLauriers twins, Hubert Barry Hemsworth, and PowerOne Capital (linked to convicted pump-and-dumper Morrie Tobin). These players all have track records of 90–100% shareholder wipeouts.
• HydroGraph has ~60M in-the-money warrants representing >$150M of paper gains. Typically, once a promote has run its course, insiders cash out and leave retail investors holding the bag.
• HydroGraph’s loudest promoter is Canadian financier Kevin Bambrough, who claims the idea originated from his son. His son previously worked at PowerOne Capital, a shop notorious for its long association with penny stock promotions.
  • PowerOne insiders helped HydroGraph raise millions, and they received large blocks of shares in return, likely at average prices <$0.20/share. If they’re still holding, at current prices they’d be sitting on >$10 million in profits.
• HydroGraph’s CEO Kjirstin Breure lacks any real operational experience in the graphene industry or in any industry.
  • Breure has held various titles at HydroGraph, including CEO, COO, President, and Director, but her actual involvement has always been in marketing and investor relations.
  • Breuer appears to have fabricated her CV, with experience listed in executive positions which were actually IR and marketing roles. For example, she claimed to work for Omada Technology Systems as a consultant, then later called it IR, and eventually branded herself as COO. Omada was a one-man software company that shut down without releasing any products. Omada also had ties to Harold Davidson, the co-founder of HydroGraph.
  • Breur’s LinkedIn profile claims she previously worked as a Portfolio Manager at a company called “Leona”, but we couldn’t find evidence of this company existing. Coincidentally, Leona is Breuer’s middle name, and an early filing stated that she was a “Digital Advertiser at Leona Studios” during the same time she claimed to be a portfolio manager.
• HydroGraph’s CFO and CAO left in 2024 and were replaced with a part-time CFO-for-hire with ties to other failing micro-caps.
• In 2025, HydroGraph’s independent Chair resigned, leaving CEO Kjirstin Breure to fill the role of both CEO and Chair.
• HydroGraph has repeatedly promoted partnerships which fail to produce sales and often go completely silent following the initial announcement.
  • VolfPack Energy has been hyped as a “large energy storage” partner which HydroGraph claimed would begin production in 2025. It is actually a pre-seed Sri Lankan startup that doesn’t expect to start pilot production until 2028–29. Volfpack, whose website states they’re willing to “partner with anyone”, is so early in its business cycle that they’re unable to pay for a lease for their production facility and have resorted to DIY methods to create a small room for their battery assembly. Pictures of facilities included below.
  • Hawkeye Bio is a partnership that HydroGraph has recycled as a new opportunity generated $2.5k of sales in 2021 and has not progressed since.
  • EMP Shield was supposed to develop electromagnetic shielding solutions using HG’s graphene.
  • Bazalt Holdings was a licensing deal from 2020 that yielded few thousand in one-off sales and has quietly fizzled.
• HydroGraph has a long history of broken promises.
  • The company first guided to commercialization for 2022. They then pushed the goalposts to 2023, then to 2024, and still have yet to deliver.
  • In May 2024, management claimed “multiple large contracts” were imminent. 2024 revenue was $6,172.
  • In mid-2024, they claimed EPA approval was “six months away”. It’s been 12 months and still no EPA approval.
  • After eight years, HydroGraph still has no approvals, no customers, no scale, and no credible path forward.
• HydroGraph touts its “verification” by The Graphene Council to confer legitimacy. The Graphene Council is a for-profit trade group, owned and operated by a career consultant with no scientific credentials or scientific background.
  • The “verification” program itself is a paid membership that has certified only a few companies, several of which are now bankrupt or defunct. The Graphen Council “verified” peers like Versarien, which collapsed and became a pennystock.
  • An industry insider told us that getting a verification costs $50k-$60k and there is no threshold for passing or failing. He says: “They just put the results into a report and send it back. There’s no classification.”
• HydroGraph licenses a detonation process from Kansas State University, and claims its reactor design can produce 10MT annually. In reality, the entire company has produced less than 0.2MT total over five years.
  • Despite its production shortcomings, HydroGraph’s fully diluted market cap is double that of proven peer NanoXplore (~$500M), which has a capacity of 4,000 MT annually and generates $100M+ in revenue. Investors are paying unicorn prices for what a former HG employee describe as a “science project”.
• Industry experts and former insiders told us the probability of success was “zero”. Insiders confirmed that the machines require constant downtime and maintenance, making scaling impossible.
• To achieve commercial scale, HydroGraph requires EPA approval and without it, they are restricted to selling small R&D batches. Former employees told us approval is at least 5–10 years away.
  • We believe HydroGraph could get approval within the next 2 years, but with onerous restrictions on use cases and customers. Either way, the timeline for EPA approval is uncertain and profitability is a pipe dream.
• FDA approval for food and beverage packaging “may never” occur due to nanoparticle toxicity: HydroGraph’s 20–50nm particles are ~1,900x smaller than approved peers, raising inhalation and organ accumulation risks. Without regulatory clearance, HydroGraph’s supposed trillion-dollar TAM is a fantasy.
  • HydroGraph claims to be the “most cost-effective producer” in the industry, but insiders reveal that this plan ignores critical costs like acetylene production, compression, transport, and safety infrastructure. Competitor NanoXplore sells exfoliate graphene for $10/kg, while HydroGraph claims its graphene will cost $200-250/kg. At the same time, HydroGraph insiders estimate the actual cost of production at $500–800/kg!
• Hydrograph’s product has no real market. The battery market is already locked up by cheaper proven solutions like carbon black and carbon nanotubes. At the same time, potentially big markets like concrete, coatings, and composites are incredibly price sensitive and rely on penny-per-kg additives, making Hydrograph’s $200/kg graphene a non-starter.
• The economics are equally broken. We estimate Hydrograph’s absolute cost floor to be ~$50/kg with $200–250/kg selling prices, versus entrenched competitors at $1–3/kg for carbon black, $20–50/kg for carbon nanotubes, and <$10/kg for carbon fiber. With graphene costing an order-of-magnitude more, it’s uneconomic. Even if it has performance advantages in some applications, the high cost means it will never have meaningful market share.
• HydroGraph appears to be misrepresenting its product to investors. Hydrograph claims to produce “100% crystalline” and “100% SP2 bonded” graphene. We spoke to an industry expert with a PhD in nanomaterials, who said that this is a scientific impossibility since true SP2 requires single-layer graphene while their own filings admit an average of six layers. The most precise method to produce single-layer graphene is chemical vapor deposition (CVD), and even CVD doesn’t produce 100% SP2 bonded graphene because of the presence of defects. Further, HydroGraph’s own filings admit that their graphene is not single-layer, but rather an average of six layers.
• Hydrograph claims its manufacturing process can be scaled by replicating their small explosive chambers, but each run requires venting flammable gas, scraping soot, and resealing which is a manual, unsafe, and costly process. Also, the explosive production process causes extensive wear and tear, leading to downtime, and shortening the reactor lifespan to well below the 20-year life implied by HydroGraph. This means the true CapEx and OpEx are far higher than the company claims.
• HydroGraph claims to be the only producer of “high-purity graphene”. However, UK-based Levidian Nanosystems claims to produce >99% pure graphene, has real customers (ADNOC, United Utilities), reputable investors (Baker Hughes, Abu Dhabi sovereign fund), and claims to have revenue of £10M in 2024.
• HydroGraph is audited by MNP LLP, a Canadian accounting firm notorious for rubber-stamping low-quality issuers and China-linked frauds, according to PCAOB records.

HydroGraph’s story is not new, it follows a well-worn Canadian microcap playbook:

Introduction

Our research indicates that HydroGraph is a glorified science project with no commercial viability. The company has a track record of misleading investors, lacks regulatory approval, and spends far more on stock promotion than R&D. Like other hyped Canadian micro-caps, we believe the stock will collapse as the company fails to deliver and promoters cash out their windfall gains.

Key Findings

• HydroGraph promotes itself as a leader of the so-called “graphene age”, boasting of producing the “most powerful graphene in the industry”, with 20–50nm particle sizes and >99% purity. In reality, it has produced less than 200kg ever, and generated sales of only $6k in 2024.
• HydroGraph’s fully diluted market capitalization exceeded ~$1.2 billion (CAD), and shares are up close to +1000% in one month on the back of an organized paid promotion campaign. Since 2023, HydroGraph has spent ~6x more on promotion, travel, and “professional fees” than on R&D.
  • Often without disclosure, paid promotion includes CEO.ca, Emerging Growth, Planet MicroCap, Jay Taylor Media, Darrow, and Metals Investor Forum.
  • Two PR firms, hired by HydroGraph, published case studies bragging how they manufactured hype around HG.
• HydroGraph is the latest in a long line of graphene promotions. Zentek, GMG, Versarien, Haydale, and Applied Graphene all sold the same dream of trillion-dollar graphene markets, fueled by endless promotional announcements. These promotes all failed to scale, diluted heavily, and had average stock price declines of 92% from peak. HydroGraph is running the same playbook.
• HydroGraph’s early backers include some of Canada’s most notorious microcap financiers including the DesLauriers twins, Hubert Barry Hemsworth, and PowerOne Capital (linked to convicted pump-and-dumper Morrie Tobin). These players all have track records of 90–100% shareholder wipeouts.
• HydroGraph has ~60M in-the-money warrants representing >$150M of paper gains. Typically, once a promote has run its course, insiders cash out and leave retail investors holding the bag.
• HydroGraph’s loudest promoter is Canadian financier Kevin Bambrough, who claims the idea originated from his son. His son previously worked at PowerOne Capital, a shop notorious for its long association with penny stock promotions.
  • PowerOne insiders helped HydroGraph raise millions, and they received large blocks of shares in return, likely at average prices <$0.20/share. If they’re still holding, at current prices they’d be sitting on >$10 million in profits.
• HydroGraph’s CEO Kjirstin Breure lacks any real operational experience in the graphene industry or in any industry.
  • Breure has held various titles at HydroGraph, including CEO, COO, President, and Director, but her actual involvement has always been in marketing and investor relations.
  • Breuer appears to have fabricated her CV, with experience listed in executive positions which were actually IR and marketing roles. For example, she claimed to work for Omada Technology Systems as a consultant, then later called it IR, and eventually branded herself as COO. Omada was a one-man software company that shut down without releasing any products. Omada also had ties to Harold Davidson, the co-founder of HydroGraph.
  • Breur’s LinkedIn profile claims she previously worked as a Portfolio Manager at a company called “Leona”, but we couldn’t find evidence of this company existing. Coincidentally, Leona is Breuer’s middle name, and an early filing stated that she was a “Digital Advertiser at Leona Studios” during the same time she claimed to be a portfolio manager.
• HydroGraph’s CFO and CAO left in 2024 and were replaced with a part-time CFO-for-hire with ties to other failing micro-caps.
• In 2025, HydroGraph’s independent Chair resigned, leaving CEO Kjirstin Breure to fill the role of both CEO and Chair.
• HydroGraph has repeatedly promoted partnerships which fail to produce sales and often go completely silent following the initial announcement.
  • VolfPack Energy has been hyped as a “large energy storage” partner which HydroGraph claimed would begin production in 2025. It is actually a pre-seed Sri Lankan startup that doesn’t expect to start pilot production until 2028–29. Volfpack, whose website states they’re willing to “partner with anyone”, is so early in its business cycle that they’re unable to pay for a lease for their production facility and have resorted to DIY methods to create a small room for their battery assembly. Pictures of facilities included below.
  • Hawkeye Bio is a partnership that HydroGraph has recycled as a new opportunity generated $2.5k of sales in 2021 and has not progressed since.
  • EMP Shield was supposed to develop electromagnetic shielding solutions using HG’s graphene.
  • Bazalt Holdings was a licensing deal from 2020 that yielded few thousand in one-off sales and has quietly fizzled.
• HydroGraph has a long history of broken promises.
  • The company first guided to commercialization for 2022. They then pushed the goalposts to 2023, then to 2024, and still have yet to deliver.
  • In May 2024, management claimed “multiple large contracts” were imminent. 2024 revenue was $6,172.
  • In mid-2024, they claimed EPA approval was “six months away”. It’s been 12 months and still no EPA approval.
  • After eight years, HydroGraph still has no approvals, no customers, no scale, and no credible path forward.
• HydroGraph touts its “verification” by The Graphene Council to confer legitimacy. The Graphene Council is a for-profit trade group, owned and operated by a career consultant with no scientific credentials or scientific background.
  • The “verification” program itself is a paid membership that has certified only a few companies, several of which are now bankrupt or defunct. The Graphen Council “verified” peers like Versarien, which collapsed and became a pennystock.
  • An industry insider told us that getting a verification costs $50k-$60k and there is no threshold for passing or failing. He says: “They just put the results into a report and send it back. There’s no classification.”
• HydroGraph licenses a detonation process from Kansas State University, and claims its reactor design can produce 10MT annually. In reality, the entire company has produced less than 0.2MT total over five years.
  • Despite its production shortcomings, HydroGraph’s fully diluted market cap is double that of proven peer NanoXplore (~$500M), which has a capacity of 4,000 MT annually and generates $100M+ in revenue. Investors are paying unicorn prices for what a former HG employee describe as a “science project”.
• Industry experts and former insiders told us the probability of success was “zero”. Insiders confirmed that the machines require constant downtime and maintenance, making scaling impossible.
• To achieve commercial scale, HydroGraph requires EPA approval and without it, they are restricted to selling small R&D batches. Former employees told us approval is at least 5–10 years away.
  • We believe HydroGraph could get approval within the next 2 years, but with onerous restrictions on use cases and customers. Either way, the timeline for EPA approval is uncertain and profitability is a pipe dream.
• FDA approval for food and beverage packaging “may never” occur due to nanoparticle toxicity: HydroGraph’s 20–50nm particles are ~1,900x smaller than approved peers, raising inhalation and organ accumulation risks. Without regulatory clearance, HydroGraph’s supposed trillion-dollar TAM is a fantasy.
  • HydroGraph claims to be the “most cost-effective producer” in the industry, but insiders reveal that this plan ignores critical costs like acetylene production, compression, transport, and safety infrastructure. Competitor NanoXplore sells exfoliate graphene for $10/kg, while HydroGraph claims its graphene will cost $200-250/kg. At the same time, HydroGraph insiders estimate the actual cost of production at $500–800/kg!
• Hydrograph’s product has no real market. The battery market is already locked up by cheaper proven solutions like carbon black and carbon nanotubes. At the same time, potentially big markets like concrete, coatings, and composites are incredibly price sensitive and rely on penny-per-kg additives, making Hydrograph’s $200/kg graphene a non-starter.
• The economics are equally broken. We estimate Hydrograph’s absolute cost floor to be ~$50/kg with $200–250/kg selling prices, versus entrenched competitors at $1–3/kg for carbon black, $20–50/kg for carbon nanotubes, and <$10/kg for carbon fiber. With graphene costing an order-of-magnitude more, it’s uneconomic. Even if it has performance advantages in some applications, the high cost means it will never have meaningful market share.
• HydroGraph appears to be misrepresenting its product to investors. Hydrograph claims to produce “100% crystalline” and “100% SP2 bonded” graphene. We spoke to an industry expert with a PhD in nanomaterials, who said that this is a scientific impossibility since true SP2 requires single-layer graphene while their own filings admit an average of six layers. The most precise method to produce single-layer graphene is chemical vapor deposition (CVD), and even CVD doesn’t produce 100% SP2 bonded graphene because of the presence of defects. Further, HydroGraph’s own filings admit that their graphene is not single-layer, but rather an average of six layers.
• Hydrograph claims its manufacturing process can be scaled by replicating their small explosive chambers, but each run requires venting flammable gas, scraping soot, and resealing which is a manual, unsafe, and costly process. Also, the explosive production process causes extensive wear and tear, leading to downtime, and shortening the reactor lifespan to well below the 20-year life implied by HydroGraph. This means the true CapEx and OpEx are far higher than the company claims.
• HydroGraph claims to be the only producer of “high-purity graphene”. However, UK-based Levidian Nanosystems claims to produce >99% pure graphene, has real customers (ADNOC, United Utilities), reputable investors (Baker Hughes, Abu Dhabi sovereign fund), and claims to have revenue of £10M in 2024.
• HydroGraph is audited by MNP LLP, a Canadian accounting firm notorious for rubber-stamping low-quality issuers and China-linked frauds, according to PCAOB records.

HydroGraph’s story is not new, it follows a well-worn Canadian microcap playbook:

Introduction

Our research indicates that HydroGraph is a glorified science project with no commercial viability. The company has a track record of misleading investors, lacks regulatory approval, and spends far more on stock promotion than R&D. Like other hyped Canadian micro-caps, we believe the stock will collapse as the company fails to deliver and promoters cash out their windfall gains.

Key Findings

• HydroGraph promotes itself as a leader of the so-called “graphene age”, boasting of producing the “most powerful graphene in the industry”, with 20–50nm particle sizes and >99% purity. In reality, it has produced less than 200kg ever, and generated sales of only $6k in 2024.
• HydroGraph’s fully diluted market capitalization exceeded ~$1.2 billion (CAD), and shares are up close to +1000% in one month on the back of an organized paid promotion campaign. Since 2023, HydroGraph has spent ~6x more on promotion, travel, and “professional fees” than on R&D.
  • Often without disclosure, paid promotion includes CEO.ca, Emerging Growth, Planet MicroCap, Jay Taylor Media, Darrow, and Metals Investor Forum.
  • Two PR firms, hired by HydroGraph, published case studies bragging how they manufactured hype around HG.
• HydroGraph is the latest in a long line of graphene promotions. Zentek, GMG, Versarien, Haydale, and Applied Graphene all sold the same dream of trillion-dollar graphene markets, fueled by endless promotional announcements. These promotes all failed to scale, diluted heavily, and had average stock price declines of 92% from peak. HydroGraph is running the same playbook.
• HydroGraph’s early backers include some of Canada’s most notorious microcap financiers including the DesLauriers twins, Hubert Barry Hemsworth, and PowerOne Capital (linked to convicted pump-and-dumper Morrie Tobin). These players all have track records of 90–100% shareholder wipeouts.
• HydroGraph has ~60M in-the-money warrants representing >$150M of paper gains. Typically, once a promote has run its course, insiders cash out and leave retail investors holding the bag.
• HydroGraph’s loudest promoter is Canadian financier Kevin Bambrough, who claims the idea originated from his son. His son previously worked at PowerOne Capital, a shop notorious for its long association with penny stock promotions.
  • PowerOne insiders helped HydroGraph raise millions, and they received large blocks of shares in return, likely at average prices <$0.20/share. If they’re still holding, at current prices they’d be sitting on >$10 million in profits.
• HydroGraph’s CEO Kjirstin Breure lacks any real operational experience in the graphene industry or in any industry.
  • Breure has held various titles at HydroGraph, including CEO, COO, President, and Director, but her actual involvement has always been in marketing and investor relations.
  • Breuer appears to have fabricated her CV, with experience listed in executive positions which were actually IR and marketing roles. For example, she claimed to work for Omada Technology Systems as a consultant, then later called it IR, and eventually branded herself as COO. Omada was a one-man software company that shut down without releasing any products. Omada also had ties to Harold Davidson, the co-founder of HydroGraph.
  • Breur’s LinkedIn profile claims she previously worked as a Portfolio Manager at a company called “Leona”, but we couldn’t find evidence of this company existing. Coincidentally, Leona is Breuer’s middle name, and an early filing stated that she was a “Digital Advertiser at Leona Studios” during the same time she claimed to be a portfolio manager.
• HydroGraph’s CFO and CAO left in 2024 and were replaced with a part-time CFO-for-hire with ties to other failing micro-caps.
• In 2025, HydroGraph’s independent Chair resigned, leaving CEO Kjirstin Breure to fill the role of both CEO and Chair.
• HydroGraph has repeatedly promoted partnerships which fail to produce sales and often go completely silent following the initial announcement.
  • VolfPack Energy has been hyped as a “large energy storage” partner which HydroGraph claimed would begin production in 2025. It is actually a pre-seed Sri Lankan startup that doesn’t expect to start pilot production until 2028–29. Volfpack, whose website states they’re willing to “partner with anyone”, is so early in its business cycle that they’re unable to pay for a lease for their production facility and have resorted to DIY methods to create a small room for their battery assembly. Pictures of facilities included below.
  • Hawkeye Bio is a partnership that HydroGraph has recycled as a new opportunity generated $2.5k of sales in 2021 and has not progressed since.
  • EMP Shield was supposed to develop electromagnetic shielding solutions using HG’s graphene.
  • Bazalt Holdings was a licensing deal from 2020 that yielded few thousand in one-off sales and has quietly fizzled.
• HydroGraph has a long history of broken promises.
  • The company first guided to commercialization for 2022. They then pushed the goalposts to 2023, then to 2024, and still have yet to deliver.
  • In May 2024, management claimed “multiple large contracts” were imminent. 2024 revenue was $6,172.
  • In mid-2024, they claimed EPA approval was “six months away”. It’s been 12 months and still no EPA approval.
  • After eight years, HydroGraph still has no approvals, no customers, no scale, and no credible path forward.
• HydroGraph touts its “verification” by The Graphene Council to confer legitimacy. The Graphene Council is a for-profit trade group, owned and operated by a career consultant with no scientific credentials or scientific background.
  • The “verification” program itself is a paid membership that has certified only a few companies, several of which are now bankrupt or defunct. The Graphen Council “verified” peers like Versarien, which collapsed and became a pennystock.
  • An industry insider told us that getting a verification costs $50k-$60k and there is no threshold for passing or failing. He says: “They just put the results into a report and send it back. There’s no classification.”
• HydroGraph licenses a detonation process from Kansas State University, and claims its reactor design can produce 10MT annually. In reality, the entire company has produced less than 0.2MT total over five years.
  • Despite its production shortcomings, HydroGraph’s fully diluted market cap is double that of proven peer NanoXplore (~$500M), which has a capacity of 4,000 MT annually and generates $100M+ in revenue. Investors are paying unicorn prices for what a former HG employee describe as a “science project”.
• Industry experts and former insiders told us the probability of success was “zero”. Insiders confirmed that the machines require constant downtime and maintenance, making scaling impossible.
• To achieve commercial scale, HydroGraph requires EPA approval and without it, they are restricted to selling small R&D batches. Former employees told us approval is at least 5–10 years away.
  • We believe HydroGraph could get approval within the next 2 years, but with onerous restrictions on use cases and customers. Either way, the timeline for EPA approval is uncertain and profitability is a pipe dream.
• FDA approval for food and beverage packaging “may never” occur due to nanoparticle toxicity: HydroGraph’s 20–50nm particles are ~1,900x smaller than approved peers, raising inhalation and organ accumulation risks. Without regulatory clearance, HydroGraph’s supposed trillion-dollar TAM is a fantasy.
  • HydroGraph claims to be the “most cost-effective producer” in the industry, but insiders reveal that this plan ignores critical costs like acetylene production, compression, transport, and safety infrastructure. Competitor NanoXplore sells exfoliate graphene for $10/kg, while HydroGraph claims its graphene will cost $200-250/kg. At the same time, HydroGraph insiders estimate the actual cost of production at $500–800/kg!
• Hydrograph’s product has no real market. The battery market is already locked up by cheaper proven solutions like carbon black and carbon nanotubes. At the same time, potentially big markets like concrete, coatings, and composites are incredibly price sensitive and rely on penny-per-kg additives, making Hydrograph’s $200/kg graphene a non-starter.
• The economics are equally broken. We estimate Hydrograph’s absolute cost floor to be ~$50/kg with $200–250/kg selling prices, versus entrenched competitors at $1–3/kg for carbon black, $20–50/kg for carbon nanotubes, and <$10/kg for carbon fiber. With graphene costing an order-of-magnitude more, it’s uneconomic. Even if it has performance advantages in some applications, the high cost means it will never have meaningful market share.
• HydroGraph appears to be misrepresenting its product to investors. Hydrograph claims to produce “100% crystalline” and “100% SP2 bonded” graphene. We spoke to an industry expert with a PhD in nanomaterials, who said that this is a scientific impossibility since true SP2 requires single-layer graphene while their own filings admit an average of six layers. The most precise method to produce single-layer graphene is chemical vapor deposition (CVD), and even CVD doesn’t produce 100% SP2 bonded graphene because of the presence of defects. Further, HydroGraph’s own filings admit that their graphene is not single-layer, but rather an average of six layers.
• Hydrograph claims its manufacturing process can be scaled by replicating their small explosive chambers, but each run requires venting flammable gas, scraping soot, and resealing which is a manual, unsafe, and costly process. Also, the explosive production process causes extensive wear and tear, leading to downtime, and shortening the reactor lifespan to well below the 20-year life implied by HydroGraph. This means the true CapEx and OpEx are far higher than the company claims.
• HydroGraph claims to be the only producer of “high-purity graphene”. However, UK-based Levidian Nanosystems claims to produce >99% pure graphene, has real customers (ADNOC, United Utilities), reputable investors (Baker Hughes, Abu Dhabi sovereign fund), and claims to have revenue of £10M in 2024.
• HydroGraph is audited by MNP LLP, a Canadian accounting firm notorious for rubber-stamping low-quality issuers and China-linked frauds, according to PCAOB records.

HydroGraph’s story is not new, it follows a well-worn Canadian microcap playbook:

Introduction

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. The company recently announced deals with eye-watering dollar amounts in a desperate attempt to prop up their share price and management’s investment company, AWN, which holds $30m of worthless loans to VVPR, representing the bulk of the investment company’s assets.

Key Findings

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. This is evident in the FY2024 financials:

Introduction

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. The company recently announced deals with eye-watering dollar amounts in a desperate attempt to prop up their share price and management’s investment company, AWN, which holds $30m of worthless loans to VVPR, representing the bulk of the investment company’s assets.

Key Findings

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. This is evident in the FY2024 financials:

Introduction

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. The company recently announced deals with eye-watering dollar amounts in a desperate attempt to prop up their share price and management’s investment company, AWN, which holds $30m of worthless loans to VVPR, representing the bulk of the investment company’s assets.

Key Findings

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. This is evident in the FY2024 financials:

Introduction

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. The company recently announced deals with eye-watering dollar amounts in a desperate attempt to prop up their share price and management’s investment company, AWN, which holds $30m of worthless loans to VVPR, representing the bulk of the investment company’s assets.

Key Findings

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. This is evident in the FY2024 financials:

Introduction

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. The company recently announced deals with eye-watering dollar amounts in a desperate attempt to prop up their share price and management’s investment company, AWN, which holds $30m of worthless loans to VVPR, representing the bulk of the investment company’s assets.

Key Findings

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. This is evident in the FY2024 financials:

Introduction

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. The company recently announced deals with eye-watering dollar amounts in a desperate attempt to prop up their share price and management’s investment company, AWN, which holds $30m of worthless loans to VVPR, representing the bulk of the investment company’s assets.

Key Findings

VVPR is a worthless shell with no revenue or meaningful assets. This is evident in the FY2024 financials:

Introduction

We believe QUBT is a rampant fraud and shareholders will likely be left with nothing. From inception, the company has fabricated revenue, misrepresented their products, and issued a steady stream of false press releases. To conceal their fraud, QUBT even included a clause in employee separation agreements prohibiting them from talking to the SEC.

Key Findings

Fake Products

“They insinuated that there were products that were farther along than they were, to lead the public to believe they had quantum capabilities that they didn’t and products that were in customers hands when they weren’t.” - Former QUBT employee

Introduction

We believe QUBT is a rampant fraud and shareholders will likely be left with nothing. From inception, the company has fabricated revenue, misrepresented their products, and issued a steady stream of false press releases. To conceal their fraud, QUBT even included a clause in employee separation agreements prohibiting them from talking to the SEC.

Key Findings

Fake Products

“They insinuated that there were products that were farther along than they were, to lead the public to believe they had quantum capabilities that they didn’t and products that were in customers hands when they weren’t.” - Former QUBT employee

Introduction

We believe QUBT is a rampant fraud and shareholders will likely be left with nothing. From inception, the company has fabricated revenue, misrepresented their products, and issued a steady stream of false press releases. To conceal their fraud, QUBT even included a clause in employee separation agreements prohibiting them from talking to the SEC.

Key Findings

Fake Products

“They insinuated that there were products that were farther along than they were, to lead the public to believe they had quantum capabilities that they didn’t and products that were in customers hands when they weren’t.” - Former QUBT employee

Introduction

Laser Photonics Corp is a new shell for a long-running fraud orchestrated by company insiders. The previous incarnation of the company was called Fonon Corp. (OTC: FNON). In that case, shareholders were defrauded through undisclosed related party transactions and investors were left with nothing. Fonon never filed a single audited financial statement and simply disappeared. The company’s registration was later revoked by the SEC.

We believe LASE is worthless and will end like all of Nikitin’s previous ventures, with investors wiped out, and new lawsuits alleging fraud.

Introduction

Laser Photonics Corp is a new shell for a long-running fraud orchestrated by company insiders. The previous incarnation of the company was called Fonon Corp. (OTC: FNON). In that case, shareholders were defrauded through undisclosed related party transactions and investors were left with nothing. Fonon never filed a single audited financial statement and simply disappeared. The company’s registration was later revoked by the SEC.

We believe LASE is worthless and will end like all of Nikitin’s previous ventures, with investors wiped out, and new lawsuits alleging fraud.

Introduction

SoundHound is an unprofitable 19-year-old company with a broken business model and no clear path to profitability. Management has deceived investors about their technology, partnerships, revenue, and growth. Multiple large customers have paid SoundHound to cancel their contracts, but the company has recorded these one-time payments as product revenue. SoundHound also pulls revenue forward in time for products that customers have not yet built and for which SoundHound has not been paid. Given SoundHound’s history of losing large contracts, we feel it’s likely that much of this revenue will never materialize.

Introduction

SoundHound is an unprofitable 19-year-old company with a broken business model and no clear path to profitability. Management has deceived investors about their technology, partnerships, revenue, and growth. Multiple large customers have paid SoundHound to cancel their contracts, but the company has recorded these one-time payments as product revenue. SoundHound also pulls revenue forward in time for products that customers have not yet built and for which SoundHound has not been paid. Given SoundHound’s history of losing large contracts, we feel it’s likely that much of this revenue will never materialize.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Introduction

Safety Shot Inc claims to produce a revolutionary detox drink that can lower a persons blood alcohol content by 50% in 30 minutes. Our investigation reveals that the drink is a sham and the company is run by a shady cast of characters with a long history of financial misdeeds. The company’s history of unfulfilled promises, false product claims, and ethically challenged management, lead us to conclude that Safety Shot belongs in the OTC trash bin.

Key Takeaways

• FingerMotion has been the subject of a recent promotional campaign targeting retail investors on social media platforms.
• FingerMotion funds promotional actively through large share issuances to unnamed “consultants”.
• FingerMotion’s stock promotion activities was flagged in the past by OTC Markets.
• The promotional campaign coincided with a 350% run-up in the stock price to bypass the “baby shelf” rule.
• FingerMotion is low on cash and has disclosed that it will need to raise money.
• FingerMotion has an effective Shelf Registration for $300m including a $25m ATM.
• The $300m Shelf Registration and $25m ATM agreement will likely cause significant shareholder dilution.
• Millions of shares are registered by PIPE investors from a low cost-basis and can be sold at any time.
• FingerMotion has given out millions of shares to repay debt investors. Most of these shares have not been sold yet.
• FingerMotion relies on accounting gimmicks to portray large revenue growth.
• FingerMotion’s balance sheet is deteriorating, the company’s gross margin is eroding, and cash burn is increasing.
• Insiders have begun selling shares.

We don’t think it’s a coincidence that the promotional campaign is happening just as the company files to sell shares ATM (effective and able for use). Nor do we think it’s a coincidence that insiders have been selling into the recent run-up in the stock price.

Introduction

This is a supplemental report to our original Knightscope report published on July 16, 2023. Since then, we have continued to investigate the company and monitor its performance. Knightscope’s latest 10Q filing indicates that the company is deteriorating faster than we anticipated. We’ve also uncovered new troubling information about the company and its management team.

Key Findings

• Large scale dilution: shares outstanding increased by more than 50% in 3 months.
• Despite spending big on robots, the most of the revenue growth isn’t from robots sales.
• Stock price is supported by heavy promotion targeting retail investors.
  • Almost daily PRs of new contracts with no details
  • Google ads
• Knightscope stopped reporting important KPIs after Q3 2021. We believe this is an intentional effort to obscure the true economics of the business and hide poor performance. 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018
• Sales of call boxes is subsidizing the failed robot biz.
• Call boxes are a highly competitive, low-margin business.
• We believe the company has insufficient cash-on-hand to service its existing contracts and will need to raise more capital.
• From reviewing Knightscope contracts and speaking with customers, we believe Knightscope is discounting their products to boost sales.
• Sales are further boosted through expensive financing deals to help customers afford the robots.
• On top of the finance discount, when a customer defaults on their financing, Knightscope assumes 50% of the loss.
• The financing deals worsen the unit economics of the business which already has negative gross margins.
• Snuck in a Bond offering to retail of $10mln (Noteworthy they mentioned this at the very end of a prerecorded video but unheard in their earnings report)
• Knightscope’s independent auditor, BPM, included a going concern warning with their opinion.
• If Knightscope goes bankrupt, like Li’s previous company, common shareholders will get nothing because they’re liquidation rights are superseded by debt holders and 4 classes of preferred shares.
• We believe the interests of management are not aligned with other shareholders and that common shareholders bear substantially all the risk of the Company failing.
• While the company performed poorly in 2022, CEO Li and his wife were paid over $2 million by Knightscope. Li even received a substantial raise.
• Management owns a minority of shares but has virtual control of the Company through super-voting shares that get 10 votes each.
• There are numerous red flags which indicate accounting issues and lead us to question the accuracy of the Company’s financial statements.
• Knightscope disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting in years 2022[1][2], 2021, 2020, 2019, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014.
• On January 26, 2023, half of the non-employee directors voluntarily resigned from the Company’s board.
• After repeated accounting challenges, Knightscope hired Mallorie Burak as CFO, who was fired from her last role for what the CEO alleged were significant material weaknesses in internal control.
• CFO Mallorie Burak is neither a licensed CPA nor a CFA.
• Knightscope changed auditors on Nov. 2 2020 while the annual audit was likely underway. The Company switched from E&Y to the less reputable firm BPM LLP.
• Knightscope’s new auditor, BPM LLP, was censured and fined $50k less than a month ago by the PCAOB. The partner in question is the same one responsible for the Knightscope audit.

Dilution Update

ATM

As per our initial report, we were confident Knightscope would have to dilute shares through its ATM agreement. And as expected they did. From July 1, 2023 to August 11, 2023, the Company sold 3,764,215 shares of Class A Common Stock.

Key Findings

Our research indicates the company is a financial disaster with poor products and an untrustworthy management team. Upon discovering that it was a useless waste of money, one Knightscope robot took matters into its own hands and drowned itself in a nearby fountain. Knightscope investors will likely face a similar sinking feeling as losses mount and the company dilutes shareholders just to stay afloat.

• Knightscope claims their robots “fight crime” but in reality they’re “Roombas” with cameras.
• Knightscope is short on cash and will likely dilute shareholders to raise capital.
• Knightscope has an active $93m shelf and an ATM, from which it can issue shares.
• As of July 14, 2023, Knightscope is no longer subject to Baby Shelf Rule and can now take full advantage of the $93m shelf.
• Operations are funded through toxic dilution and crowdfunding.
• Revenue has flatlined over the past few years despite spending $10s of millions on marketing and continuing to spend big on R&D.
• Cash burn continues to increase and a there is no clear path to profitability.
• Knightscope’s founder and CEO has a track record of failed ventures and an impressive ability to raise capital, even when faced with a looming bankruptcy.
• Knightscope’s services are heavily disliked and customers aren’t satisfied with their services.

Introduction

Knightscope is a self-proclaimed American security and robotics company established in 2013 which builds Autonomous Security Robots (ASR’s). Since its establishment, it has managed to capture attention with its laughable attempts at innovation with “security” robots that resemble rejected Star Wars characters. The company parades itself as a solution for surveillance, but a closer look reveals those claims to be more smoke and mirrors than actual substance. In this report, we will dissect Knightscope’s impending dilution, highlighting its consistent lack of profitability, inability to scale, ineffective robotic technology, lack of customer satisfaction, and the threat of delisting from Nasdaq.

Introduction

This is a supplemental report to our original Knightscope report published on July 16, 2023. Since then, we have continued to investigate the company and monitor its performance. Knightscope’s latest 10Q filing indicates that the company is deteriorating faster than we anticipated. We’ve also uncovered new troubling information about the company and its management team.

Key Findings

• Large scale dilution: shares outstanding increased by more than 50% in 3 months.
• Despite spending big on robots, the most of the revenue growth isn’t from robots sales.
• Stock price is supported by heavy promotion targeting retail investors.
  • Almost daily PRs of new contracts with no details
  • Google ads
• Knightscope stopped reporting important KPIs after Q3 2021. We believe this is an intentional effort to obscure the true economics of the business and hide poor performance. 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018
• Sales of call boxes is subsidizing the failed robot biz.
• Call boxes are a highly competitive, low-margin business.
• We believe the company has insufficient cash-on-hand to service its existing contracts and will need to raise more capital.
• From reviewing Knightscope contracts and speaking with customers, we believe Knightscope is discounting their products to boost sales.
• Sales are further boosted through expensive financing deals to help customers afford the robots.
• On top of the finance discount, when a customer defaults on their financing, Knightscope assumes 50% of the loss.
• The financing deals worsen the unit economics of the business which already has negative gross margins.
• Snuck in a Bond offering to retail of $10mln (Noteworthy they mentioned this at the very end of a prerecorded video but unheard in their earnings report)
• Knightscope’s independent auditor, BPM, included a going concern warning with their opinion.
• If Knightscope goes bankrupt, like Li’s previous company, common shareholders will get nothing because they’re liquidation rights are superseded by debt holders and 4 classes of preferred shares.
• We believe the interests of management are not aligned with other shareholders and that common shareholders bear substantially all the risk of the Company failing.
• While the company performed poorly in 2022, CEO Li and his wife were paid over $2 million by Knightscope. Li even received a substantial raise.
• Management owns a minority of shares but has virtual control of the Company through super-voting shares that get 10 votes each.
• There are numerous red flags which indicate accounting issues and lead us to question the accuracy of the Company’s financial statements.
• Knightscope disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting in years 2022[1][2], 2021, 2020, 2019, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014.
• On January 26, 2023, half of the non-employee directors voluntarily resigned from the Company’s board.
• After repeated accounting challenges, Knightscope hired Mallorie Burak as CFO, who was fired from her last role for what the CEO alleged were significant material weaknesses in internal control.
• CFO Mallorie Burak is neither a licensed CPA nor a CFA.
• Knightscope changed auditors on Nov. 2 2020 while the annual audit was likely underway. The Company switched from E&Y to the less reputable firm BPM LLP.
• Knightscope’s new auditor, BPM LLP, was censured and fined $50k less than a month ago by the PCAOB. The partner in question is the same one responsible for the Knightscope audit.

Dilution Update

ATM

As per our initial report, we were confident Knightscope would have to dilute shares through its ATM agreement. And as expected they did. From July 1, 2023 to August 11, 2023, the Company sold 3,764,215 shares of Class A Common Stock.

Key Findings

Our research indicates the company is a financial disaster with poor products and an untrustworthy management team. Upon discovering that it was a useless waste of money, one Knightscope robot took matters into its own hands and drowned itself in a nearby fountain. Knightscope investors will likely face a similar sinking feeling as losses mount and the company dilutes shareholders just to stay afloat.

• Knightscope claims their robots “fight crime” but in reality they’re “Roombas” with cameras.
• Knightscope is short on cash and will likely dilute shareholders to raise capital.
• Knightscope has an active $93m shelf and an ATM, from which it can issue shares.
• As of July 14, 2023, Knightscope is no longer subject to Baby Shelf Rule and can now take full advantage of the $93m shelf.
• Operations are funded through toxic dilution and crowdfunding.
• Revenue has flatlined over the past few years despite spending $10s of millions on marketing and continuing to spend big on R&D.
• Cash burn continues to increase and a there is no clear path to profitability.
• Knightscope’s founder and CEO has a track record of failed ventures and an impressive ability to raise capital, even when faced with a looming bankruptcy.
• Knightscope’s services are heavily disliked and customers aren’t satisfied with their services.

Introduction

Knightscope is a self-proclaimed American security and robotics company established in 2013 which builds Autonomous Security Robots (ASR’s). Since its establishment, it has managed to capture attention with its laughable attempts at innovation with “security” robots that resemble rejected Star Wars characters. The company parades itself as a solution for surveillance, but a closer look reveals those claims to be more smoke and mirrors than actual substance. In this report, we will dissect Knightscope’s impending dilution, highlighting its consistent lack of profitability, inability to scale, ineffective robotic technology, lack of customer satisfaction, and the threat of delisting from Nasdaq.